United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in long-term success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.
Both analysts and strategists have a tendency to categorize various security threats in rather neat categories. In many – likely most – cases these categories simply do not fit well for areas where there is significant internal insecurity. This particularly is the case for groups that can be called hybrids or shape shifters. Armed groups have an unfortunate tendency to shift both their form and significance to security operations. All too often, planners and intelligence analysts are unable to adequately track the changes among what are viewed as peripheral groups, and the significance of these changes. Military strategy normally is focused on insurgents or terrorists, with some peripheral attention to militias or other armed groups. Trying to unpack the significance and operations of other, non-included groups can be very difficult. A broader form of environmental sensing – to include how intervention forces may serve as yet another actor for analysis – is critical in understanding how to achieve operational success. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This book is an effort to provide a more nuanced analysis of the LRA. Certainly, the group's endemic human rights violations receive considerable attention. Without understanding the types and extent of the abuses, the reasons for the widespread deep fears among the civilians in the LRA's areas of operations cannot be fully appreciated. Likewise, the peculiarities of the LRA's ideology must be assessed in order to describe how the group initially mobilized and recruited its members and how it continues to retain its voluntary members. There are, however, two main goals of this book. The first is to put the LRA in context. Although it might be easier -- and perhaps in some ways more comforting -- to view the LRA as uniquely violent, this simply is not accurate. As is hoped will be demonstrated, there is much more to the LRA than being a violent cult with unusual impact. Historical antecedents and the larger political and ethnic environment in Uganda helped create the conditions in which the LRA could be created. Also, although certainly with its own specific aspects, the forms of the LRA's ideology and organization are not unique among violent groups. Likewise, cultural and religious factors within Uganda and regional countries have a major impact on their internal stability. In many cases, religion (of several forms) has been a critical mobilizing and organizing tool for groups of potential security concern. Without understanding these factors, it is impossible to understand the LRA. The second goal is to assess the response to the LRA. Some of the misperceptions about the LRA in fact have shaped the responses, both regionally and internationally. Clearly, for a group that has survived for over 20 years, the adequacy of governmental responses has been a critical issue. In general, the response to the LRA by the affected countries has been military. Although the military tools have had some success in limiting LRA activities, they obviously have not eliminated the group. This in part has forced a greater emphasis on various peace negotiating strategies. The peace initiatives are given particular attention, largely because they help illustrate the seemingly endless complications in dealing with insurgent groups in complex security environments.
